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HEALTH—MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DEFENSES: 
APPLYING GOOD SAMARITAN LAWS 
TO IN-HOSPITAL EMERGENCIES 
Chamley v. Khokha, 2007 ND 69, 730 N.W.2D 864 
I. FACTS 
Ms. Chamley died after complications arose from her percutaneous 
nephrostolithotomy.1  Her longtime urologist, Dr. Salem S. Shahin, per-
formed the initial surgery to remove kidney stones.2  Post-operatively, Ms. 
Chamley experienced excessive bleeding.3  She lost so much blood that she 
went into shock.4  She had to be given seven units of replacement blood.5  
The anesthesiologist for her kidney stone removal surgery, Dr. David 
Skurdal, rated her condition as a life-threatening emergency.6  In order to 
locate the source of the internal bleeding, Dr. Shahin performed renal ex-
ploration.7  He determined the kidney needed to be removed.8 
Due to the presence of scar tissue surrounding Ms. Chamley’s kidney, 
Dr. Shahin anticipated that the surgery would be increasingly complex be-
cause he could not visualize all of the blood vessels involved.9  As a result, 
 
1. See Chamley v. Khokha, 2007 ND 69, ¶¶ 2-3, 730 N.W.2d 864, 866 (establishing that Ms. 
Chamley died after surgical complications); Brief of Appellee Inder V. Khokha at 7, Chamley v. 
Khokha, 2007 ND 69, 730 N.W.2d 864 (No. 20060261), 2006 WL 3916956 (explaining that a 
percutaneous nephrostolithotomy is a surgical procedure performed by inserting a scope into the 
kidney, using an ultrasound to break up the kidney stones, suctioning out the debris from the 
stones and inserting a catheter to allow for drainage from the kidney). 
2. Chamley, ¶ 2, 730 N.W.2d at 865. 
3. Id. 
4. Brief of Appellee Mercy Medical Center at 5, Chamley v. Khokha, 2007 ND 69, 730 
N.W.2d 864 (No. 20060261), 2006 WL 3916955; see also Brief of Appellee Khokha, supra note 
1, at 7 (stating Ms. Chamley was “shaking and in shock”). 
5. Brief of Appellee Khokha, supra note 1, at 8 (clarifying that this amount constituted 
seventy percent of her total body volume). 
6. Id.; see also Chamley, ¶ 2, 730 N.W.2d at 866 (stating that her vena cava was damaged).  
The vena cava is a large vein which collects all of the blood from the lower extremities and mid-
section before returning that blood to the heart.  HENRY MORRIS, MORRIS’ HUMAN ANATOMY: A 
COMPLETE SYSTEMATIC TREATISE 775, 777 (J. Parsons Schaeffer ed., 11th ed. 1953) (1893).  
Damage to the vena cava is often hard to manage because there is a great likelihood of resulting 
damage to multiple organs, and the mortality rate from damage to the vena cava is high.  Farzad 
Najam & Gregory D. Trachiotis, Trauma to the Thoracic Great Vessels, in 44 TRAUMA 5:74 
(Harold L. Hirsh ed., 2003). 
7. Chamley, ¶ 2, 730 N.W.2d at 865. 
8. Id. 
9. Brief of Appellant at 4, Chamley, 2007 ND 69, 730 N.W.2d 864 (No. 20060261), 2006 
WL 3916957. 
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he needed assistance in separating the blood vessels while he removed the 
kidney.10  He requested the assistance of a staff surgeon, Dr. Wayne 
Anderson, who declined to help.11  Subsequently, Dr. Shahin asked Dr. 
Khokha to assist with Ms. Chamley’s surgery.12  Dr. Khokha was a general 
surgeon with vascular credentials and had the privileges of a staff physician 
at Mercy Medical Center.13 
When he was asked to help, Dr. Khokha was in the physician’s lounge 
waiting to perform a surgery on his own patient.14  He did not have an 
explicit obligation to assist Dr. Shahin on Ms. Chamley’s surgery.15  Prior 
to assisting with the kidney removal, Dr. Khokha did not have a relation-
ship with Ms. Chamley.16  Dr. Khokha was not on call to assist in surgeries 
when he was asked to aid Dr. Shahin.17  He also was not a member of a 
“code blue” team.18  Under Dr. Khokha’s employment contract, there was 
no specific requirement for him to render assistance during an emergency 
situation.19  Despite these factors, Dr. Khokha chose to assist Dr. Shahin in 
the surgery.20 
Mercy Medical Center then billed Ms. Chamley for the services 
rendered by Dr. Khokha.21  Under the terms of Dr. Khokha’s employment 
 
10. See id. (indicating that Dr. Shahin asked for assistance in removing the kidney). 
11. See Chamley, ¶ 57, 730 N.W.2d at 878 (stating another staff surgeon declined to help); 
Brief of Appellee Mercy Medical Center, supra note 4, at 8 (stating that Wayne Anderson, a 
general surgeon, declined to help because he did not think he had the ability to assist with the 
surgery). 
12. Chamley, ¶ 2, 730 N.W.2d at 865-66. 
13. Id. at 866. 
14. Id. 
15. Brief of Appellee Khokha, supra note 1, at 9. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Id.  See THE DICTIONARY OF MODERN MEDICINE 125 (J.C. Segen, M.D. ed., 1992) (de-
fining a “code blue” as an emergency announced over the hospital’s intercom system indicating 
that a cardiac arrest was in progress); see also MOSBY’S MEDICAL, NURSING & ALLIED HEALTH 
DICTIONARY 265 (Kenneth N. Anderson et al. eds., 5th ed. 1998) [hereinafter MOSBY’S] (identi-
fying that a “cardiac arrest” is a termination of “cardiac” functioning ).  The term “cardiac” means 
relating to the heart.  Id.  The term “code team” is defined as: “[A] specially trained and equipped 
team of physicians, nurses, and technicians that is available to provide cardiopulmonary resuscita-
tion when summoned by a code set by the institution.”  Id. at 361.  “Cardiopulmonary resuscita-
tion” is an emergency procedure for life support including external massaging of the heart and 
artificial respiration.  Id. at 271. 
19. Brief of Appellee Khokha, supra note 1, at 9.  But see Reply Brief of Appellant at 2, 
Chamley v. Khokha, 2007 ND 69, 730 N.W.2d 864 (No. 20060261), 2006 WL 3916958 (stating 
Dr. Khokha’s contract obligated him to treat all hospital patients). 
20. Chamley, ¶ 2, 730 N.W.2d at 866. 
21. Brief of Appellant, supra note 9, at 6. 
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contract, he was a salaried physician.22  Because of this, he was inadver-
tently paid for the surgeries he performed on Ms. Chamley.23 
While performing the kidney removal, the vena cava tore.24  It is un-
clear which physician was responsible for tearing the vein.25  This tear 
presented further complications and increased the amount of internal bleed-
ing that was already occurring.26  Dr. Khokha repaired the tear and stopped 
the internal bleeding.27  Post-operatively, Dr. Shahin placed Ms. Chamley 
in the Intensive Care Unit.28  The next day, Ms. Chamley was transferred 
from Mercy Medical Center in Williston to St. Alexius hospital in Bismarck 
via air ambulance.29  She was placed under the care of Dr. William 
Altringer, a vascular surgeon.30  Upon arrival, Ms. Chamley underwent 
another surgery.31  Ms. Chamley died later that day at St. Alexius hospital.32 
Ms. Chamley’s son, William Chamley, brought a wrongful death action 
against Dr. Khokha, Dr. Shahin, and Mercy Medical Center, alleging pro-
fessional negligence against the physicians and vicarious liability on behalf 
of the hospital.33  Dr. Shahin settled out of the case.34  The trial court found 
in favor of the defendants, Mercy Medical Center and Dr. Khokha, on a 
 
22. Id. at 4.  Under the terms of Dr. Khokha’s employment contract, he was required to 
provide surgical services as required by the hospital.  Chamley, ¶ 10, 730 N.W.2d at 867. 
23. Brief of Appellant, supra note 9, at 4-6 (implying from Dr. Khokha’s “Physician 
Employment Agreement” that he was indirectly compensated for the services he performed).  Dr. 
Khokha gave the hospital the right to bill for his services in exchange for a salary.  Id. 
24. Id. at 5-6.  See MORRIS, supra note 6, at 775 (stating that the inferior vena cava connects 
“[a]ll of the veins of the abdomen, pelvis, and lower extremities, with few exceptions of the 
superior epigastric and ascending lumbar veins”).  Since Ms. Chamley’s surgery was on her 
kidney, the inferior vena cava was likely the vena cava referenced within the case.  See id. at 775, 
777; Chamley, ¶ 2, 730 N.W.2d at 866 (explaining Ms. Chamley’s vena cava was torn, but not 
clarifying what portion of the vena cava). 
25. Brief of Appellant, supra note 9, at 6. 
26. See Chamley, ¶ 2, 730 N.W.2d at 865-66 (stating there was already excessive internal 
bleeding and the tear of the vena cava would have caused further internal bleeding). 
27. See id. at 866 (stating that Dr. Khokha had to repair the vena cava and that the repair 
stopped the internal bleeding). 
28. Brief of Appellee Mercy Medical Center, supra note 4, at 5; see also Brief of Appellee 
Khokha, supra note 1, at 9 (delineating the post-operative steps taken in caring for Ms. Chamley 
including being transferred into intensive care). 
29. Brief of Appellee Khokha, supra note 1, at 8-9; see also Brief of Appellee Mercy 
Medical Center, supra note 4, at 5 (identifying the hospitals where Ms. Chamley was treated). 
30. Brief of Appellee Khokha, supra note 1, at 9. 
31. Brief of Appellant, supra note 9, at 6.  The Brief of Appellant does not say what was 
done surgically for Ms. Chamley while she was in Bismarck.  Id.  No source specifically identifies 
the cause of Ms. Chamley’s death.  See Chamley, ¶ 2, 730 N.W.2d at 865-66 (suggesting no cause 
of death); see also Brief of Appellee Mercy Medical Center, supra note 4, at 5 (implying 
continued internal bleeding was the cause of death); Brief of Appellee Khokha, supra note 1, at 8-
9 (insinuating that the cause of Ms. Chamley’s death was her care in Bismarck). 
32. Brief of Appellee Mercy Medical Center, supra note 4, at 5. 
33. Id. at 3-4. 
34. Chamley, ¶ 3, 730 N.W.2d at 866. 
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summary judgment motion and granted immunity to Dr. Khokha under the 
Good Samaritan statute.35  The trial court dismissed the claims with preju-
dice.36  Mr. Chamley then appealed the case to the North Dakota Supreme 
Court.37 
The issue on appeal was “whether the district court erred in granting 
Dr. Khokha’s and Mercy Medical Center’s motion for summary judgment 
on the basis of Dr. Khokha’s immunity from suit and from liability under 
the Good Samaritan Law.”38  The court held that when there is an expecta-
tion of remuneration, physicians are precluded from Good Samaritan 
immunity.39  The court based this decision upon Section 32-03.1-04 of the 
North Dakota Century Code.40 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Good Samaritan Act has roots in Biblical law.41  During the 
formation of English law, Biblical law had a strong influence.42  The United 
States subsequently incorporated a substantial amount of English law into 
its legal system, and with it, many concepts from Biblical law.43  An 
embodiment of Biblical law can be seen through the states’ formations of 
 
35. Id. 




40. Id.  See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.1-04 (1996 & Supp. 2007). 
Nothing in this chapter may be construed to deprive any physician or surgeon licensed 
in this state of the right to collect reasonable fees for any acts of aid, assistance or 
treatment; or any other person rendering aid or assistance under this chapter, or those 
whose property is necessarily damaged in the course of such aid or assistance under 
this chapter, of the right to reimbursement, from the injured or ill person or that 
person’s estate for any expenses or damages which appeared reasonable and necessary 
to incur under the circumstances.  Any person rendering aid or assistance with an 
expectation of remuneration shall not be covered by the provisions of this chapter. 
Id.  The court based its decision on the 2005 version of the law because the legislature had not 
approved the 2007 statute at the time the case was decided.  See Chamley, 730 N.W.2d at 864 
(stating in the case caption that the decision was handed down on May 8, 2007).  The wording of 
the 2005 and 2007 versions of this statute is exactly the same.  See 2007 N.D. Laws 1142 
(changing the wording in Section 32-03.1-02.3 of the Act which is inapplicable in Chamley). 
41. See discussion infra Part II.A (identifying the origin of Good Samaritan laws). 
42. See discussion infra Part II.B (explaining that much of English common law is based on 
Mosaic law). 
43. See discussion infra Part II.C (discussing the incorporation of Biblical law into the 
American legal system). 
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Good Samaritan laws.44  North Dakota followed the trend and adopted the 
Good Samaritan Act.45 
A. BIBLICAL LAW 
Good Samaritan laws derived their name from a Biblical parable.46  
The Good Samaritan parable reads: 
Then Jesus answered and said: “A certain man went down from 
Jerusalem to Jericho, and fell among thieves, who stripped him of 
his clothing, wounded him, and departed, leaving him half dead.  
Now by chance a certain priest came down that road.  And when 
he saw him, he passed by on the other side.  Likewise a Levite, 
when he arrived at the place, came and looked, and passed by on 
the other side.  But a certain Samaritan, as he journeyed, came 
where he was.  And when he saw him, he had compassion.  So he 
went to him and bandaged his wounds, pouring on oil and wine; 
and he set him on his own animal, brought him to an inn, and took 
care of him.  On the next day, when he departed, he took out two 
denarii, gave them to the innkeeper, and said to him, ‘Take care of 
him; and whatever more you spend, when I come again, I will 
repay you.’  ‘So which of these three do you think was neighbor to 
him who fell among the thieves?’” And then he said, “He who 
showed mercy on him.”  Then Jesus said to him, “Go and do 
likewise.”47 
The story was told by Jesus to a lawyer who was seeking clarification 
on how to gain eternal life.48  Jesus told the lawyer to love God as well as 
his neighbor.49  Jesus told the parable to the lawyer to explain what it meant 
to love one’s “neighbor.”50  In the parable, the priest and the Levite would 
 
44. See discussion infra Part II.C (establishing that all of the states have adopted some form 
of a Good Samaritan law). 
45. See discussion infra Part II.D (stating that North Dakota adopted the Good Samaritan 
Act). 
46. Luke 10:30-37 (Holy Bible). 
47. Id. 
48. Luke 10:25. 
49. Luke 10:27. 
50. Luke 10:29. 
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have been considered more likely to aid the wounded man.51  However, the 
unlikely party, the Samaritan, is the one who rendered assistance.52 
The Good Samaritan parable is often credited as the first clear delinea-
tion of the valued importance of rendering aid to others in an emergency 
situation.53  The teachings behind this parable, however, are embedded in 
Mosaic law and existed before Jesus told this story.54  Mosaic law is devel-
oped in the Pentateuch.55  The concept of loving one’s neighbor as oneself56 
is one of the many principles found in Mosaic law that exemplifies the les-
son enunciated within the Good Samaritan parable.57 
B. ENGLISH LAW 
The principles from Mosaic law influenced early English law.58  The 
“English” formed through a merger of the Saxons, Angles, and Jutes.59  By 
the time the English came together as a people, both the Saxons and the 
Danes had already developed primitive legal codes that incorporated 
biblical concepts.60 
 
51. Michael N. Rader, The “Good Samaritan” in Jewish Law: Lessons for Physicians, 
Attorneys, & Laypeople, 22 J. LEGAL MED. 375, 378, 390 (2001).  The priest and the Levite are 
high religious figures.  Id. at 398.  In walking past the injured man, both the priest and the Levite 
neglected their duties under Mosaic law.  Id. at 390. 
52. See Hon. Joan B. Gottschall, Factfinding As a Spiritual Discipline, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 
325, 329 (2006) (stating that the injured man was likely Jewish and that Jews and Samaritans 
looked down on one another and would not be likely to think of each other as neighbors). 
53. See Rader, supra note 51, at 376 (explaining that the obligation to rescue does not come 
from the Good Samaritan parable, as people often think, but rather stems from concepts in the 
Hebrew Bible). 
54. See id. at 376, 381 (citing scripture verses from Mosaic law that exemplify the same 
underlying principles of the Good Samaritan parable). 
55. Elliot Klayman & Seth Klayman, Punitive Damages: Toward Torah-Based Tort Reform, 
23 CARDOZO L. REV. 221, 224 n.28 (2001).  The Pentateuch is considered to be the first five 
books of the Bible: Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Deuteronomy, and Numbers.  Id. 
56. See Lev. 19:18 (Holy Bible) (“You shall not take vengeance nor bear any grudge against 
the children of your people, but you shall love your neighbor as yourself: I am the Lord.”) 
(emphasis original). 
57. See Rader, supra note 51, at 376, 381 (identifying scripture verses from Mosaic Law that 
exemplify the same principles as those behind the Good Samaritan parable). 
58. J. Nelson Happy & Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, Genesis!: Scriptural Citation and the 
Lawyer’s Bible Project, 9 REGENT U. L. REV. 89, 97 (1997). 
59. L.B. CURZON, ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 4 (2d ed. 1979).  The Angles, Saxons, and Jutes 
were called the Teutonic tribes.  Id. at 3.  Between the seventh and ninth centuries, these three 
tribes conquered a large area of England and merged into the “English.”  Id. at 4. 
60. See Happy & Menefee, supra note 58, at 97 (stating that the Saxon laws of King Alfred 
were based on Christian principles).  King Alfred’s laws came into existence in 871-901 A.D.  
FREDERIC W. MAITLAND & FRANCIS C. MONTAGUE, A SKETCH OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 7 
(James F. Colby ed., 1915).  Prior to that, the Saxon laws of Ine, which were in existence from 
688-726 A.D., had been based upon principles from Christianity.  Id.  The Danes were also 
Christian and had Christian laws.  1 W.F. FINLASON, REEVES’ HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW, 
FROM THE TIME OF THE ROMANS TO THE END OF THE REIGN OF ELIZABETH 162, 164 n.(a) 
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English common law was based mainly on Mosaic law.61  The first 
codification of English law was conducted by King Alfred in his Doom 
Book.62  The Doom Book adopted the Ten Commandments, other portions 
of the Pentateuch and the basic form of the Golden Rule in order to set the 
foundation for the early laws of England.63 
Another religious influence on English law occurred when William the 
Conqueror invaded and conquered England in 1066 A.D.64  During his 
reign over England, he drastically changed to the English legal system by 
separating the secular and ecclesiastical courts.65  Despite this separation, 
“secular” English law continued to be largely influenced by religion 
through the late seventeenth century.66 
C. AMERICAN LAW 
When the English colonized America, the developing legal systems 
embraced Biblical law.67  In 1585, Sir Walter Raleigh founded the first 
American colony at Roanoke Island.68  Queen Elizabeth’s grant to Sir 
Walter Raleigh allowed him to enact statutes for Roanoke Island so long as 
the statutes conformed to the Christian faith followed by the Church of 
England.69  Other colonies also based their legal systems on Biblical 
teachings.70  The Puritan colonies adopted Mosaic law to combine the “Law 
 
(1880).  The Jutes and the Angles were from Denmark.  See CURZON, supra note 59, at 4 
(identifying that the Jutes were from Jutland and that the Angles were from Angeln, an area in 
southern Denmark); see also M. Donald Hancock, Denmark, in 5 THE WORLD BOOK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA 137 (2001) (stating that Jutland was a historical name for the peninsula portion of 
Denmark). 
61. Happy & Menefee, supra note 58, at 97; see also FINLASON, supra note 60, at 164-65 
(stating that English common law was based upon Mercian Law, West-Saxon Law, and Danish 
Law). 
62. See CURZON, supra note 59, at 14 (stating that the laws, or “dooms” began to form into 
legal codes at the time of King Alfred).  King Ethelbert, the first of the Christian Kings of the 
Saxons, who was converted by St. Augustine circa 597, has the earliest recorded dooms circa 600.  
Id. at 6, 14.  But see MAITLAND & MONTAGUE, supra note 60, at 4 (stating that Ethelbert was a 
Jute from Kent). 
63. Happy & Menefee, supra note 58, at 97; see also Klayman & Klayman, supra note 55, at 
224 n.28 (defining the Pentateuch). 
64. CURZON, supra note 59, at 16 (stating that William, Duke of Normandy, was crowned 
King of England in 1066 after the death of Edward the Confessor). 
65. Id. at 16-17.  Upon his crowning, William I confirmed the English laws.  Id.  A condition 
for the papal approval of his invasion of England was that he set up a separate ecclesiastical court 
system.  Id. at 17. 
66. Happy & Menefee, supra note 58, at 107. 
67. Id. 
68. Karen Ordahl Kupperman, Lost Colony, in THE WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 2001, 
vol. L at 472. 
69. Happy & Menefee, supra note 58, at 108. 
70. Id. 
        
542 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:535 
of God” with the “Law of Nature.”71  The Bible was used to supplement 
existing legal codes72 and was cited as a positive reference both by colonial 
legislative bodies and the courts.73 
America opted to only impose a moral obligation, rather than a legal 
obligation, to render aid in Good Samaritan situations.74  At common law, a 
person does not have a duty to render assistance.75  Once a person adminis-
ters aid, however, that person must use reasonable care in their efforts.76  If 
his or her efforts are not reasonable, liability can be imposed upon the care 
provider.77 
While the principles and teachings behind Good Samaritan laws have 
existed since the establishment of Mosaic law, the first codification of a 
Good Samaritan law in America did not occur until 1959.78  California was 
the first state to enact such a law.79  The California Legislature wanted the 
statute to shield Good Samaritans from tort liability.80  Subsequently, all 
fifty states and the District of Columbia have enacted some form of Good 
Samaritan law.81  The majority of states have vague provisions which do 
not identify where the emergency situation takes place; however, a minority 
of states either explicitly include or exclude hospital settings.82  An even 
 
71. Id. 
72. Id.  For example, colonial Connecticut used biblical teachings to fill in the gaps in its 
legal code.  Id. at 113-15.  
73. See, e.g., id. at 111-18 (stating that Massachusetts cited the Bible in its legal code and the 
Bible was positively cited in the courts of North Carolina and in the Bay colony). 
74. Rader, supra note 51, at 386. 
75. McDowell v. Gillie, 2001 ND 91, ¶ 6, 626 N.W.2d 666, 669. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Stewart R. Reuter, Physicians as Good Samaritans: Should They Receive Immunity for 
Their Negligence When Responding to Hospital Emergencies?, 20 J. LEGAL MED. 157, 157 
(1999). 
79. Id. 
80. STEVEN E. PEGALIS, 2 AM. LAW MED. MALP. § 7:13 (3d ed. 2005). 
81. Id. 
82. Chamley v. Khokha, 2007 ND 69, ¶ 29, 730 N.W.2d 864, 871 (quoting Velazquez v. 
Jiminez, 798 A.2d 51, 57-59 (2002)).  Twenty-nine jurisdictions have general language statutes: 
North Dakota, New Jersey, Arizona, Georgia, Delaware, Virginia, Alabama, Pennsylvania, 
Oklahoma, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Nevada, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.  Velazquez, 798 A.2d at 
59.  Eleven jurisdictions exclude immunity from hospital settings: the District of Columbia, New 
York, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, and 
Wisconsin.  Id. at 58.  Seven jurisdictions have statutes that include in-hospital settings: Alaska, 
California, Colorado, Louisiana, Michigan, Texas, and Idaho.  Id. at 58-59.  There are also four 
jurisdictions which do not provide any form of immunity: Arkansas, Hawaii, Kansas, and 
Missouri.  Id. at 59. 
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smaller minority have imposed an affirmative obligation on people to 
render assistance in the event of an emergency.83 
D. NORTH DAKOTA LAW 
North Dakota followed the national trend and enacted a Good 
Samaritan law.84  The Good Samaritan law expanded from one statute to an 
entire Act.85  While the Act broadened the class of people who were pro-
tected by Good Samaritan laws, the definitions of who would be immune 
remained vague.86  Very little precedent existed to aid in the interpretations 
under the Act.87 
1. Enactment of the Law 
North Dakota enacted its Good Samaritan law in 1971.88  The Good 
Samaritan law was vague and was originally codified as part of the Motor 
Vehicle Code and related to rendering assistance at a roadside accident.89  
The statute on roadside emergency care was subsequently amended regard-
ing eligibility for immunity.90  Specific Good Samaritan laws were also in 
the North Dakota Century Code, but they were scattered within the statutes 
particularly related to the party seeking immunity.91  In order to clarify the 
scattered Good Samaritan provisions, the legislature codified the Good 
Samaritan Act in 1987.92 
 
83. See Rader, supra note 51, at 396 (stating that Minnesota, Wisconsin, Vermont, and 
Rhode Island require bystanders to affirmatively take action beyond calling the authorities). 
84. See discussion infra Part II.D.1 (explaining the enactment of North Dakota’s initial Good 
Samaritan law). 
85. See discussion infra Part II.D.1 (discussing why the Good Samaritan law expanded from 
one statute to an entire Act). 
86. See discussion infra Part II.D.2 (interpreting the Act as vague because there was no clear 
manner to establish who would be considered a Good Samaritan). 
87. See discussion infra Part II.D.2 (citing to only one case that had previously interpreted 
the Act). 
88. H.B. 1291, 1971 Leg., 42d Sess. (N.D. 1971). 
89. Id.  A roadside accident is a typical Good Samaritan setting.  See Chamley v. Khokha, 
2007 N.D. 69, ¶ 35, 730 N.W.2d 864, 873 (discussing how the Good Samaritan law originally 
only applied to motor vehicle situations). 
90. See H.B. 1291, 1971 Leg., 42d Sess. (N.D. 1971) (excluding physicians from immunity, 
under Section 39-08-04.1, when rendering care at a roadside accident pursuant to Sections 43-17-
37 and 43-17-38 of the North Dakota Century Code); H.B. 1524, 1981 Leg., 47th Sess. (N.D. 
1981) (eliminating the exclusion regarding physicians). 
91. Chamley, ¶ 31, 730 N.W.2d at 871-72 (citing McDowell v. Gillie, 2001 ND 91, ¶ 6, 626 
N.W.2d 666, 669). 
92. H.B. 1631, 1987 Leg., 50th Sess. (N.D. 1987). 
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The Good Samaritan Act (Act) was proposed by the Trestle Valley Ski 
Patrol (Ski Patrol) of Minot, North Dakota.93  The Ski Patrol identified 
many Good Samaritans who were not eligible to receive protection.94  The 
Ski Patrol’s intent in proposing the Act was to broaden the class of individ-
uals who could be granted immunity.95  The Act passed and was codified.96 
The Act includes both general provisions regarding when the immunity 
should apply and a specific provision relating to the actions of physicians.97  
The general rule grants immunity to people who render aid in emergency 
situations.98  Under the provision specific to physicians, the North Dakota 
Century Code states that physicians cannot have an “expectation of remu-
neration” before the fact; however, physicians are not precluded from re-
ceiving compensation afterward.99  Exceptions under the Act also prevent 
 
93. See Chamley¸ ¶ 33, 730 N.W.2d at 872 (discussing House Bill 1631).  House Bill 1631 
was introduced by Representative Janet Wentz on behalf of the Trestle Valley Ski Patrol of Minot, 
North Dakota.  Id.  The organization provided first aid to injured skiers and wanted protection 
from liability.  Id.; see also Letter from Don Negaard, Attorney, Pringle & Herigstad, P.C., to 
Honorable Janet Wentz, N.D. House of Representatives (Jan. 21, 1987) (on file with the North 
Dakota School of Law Library) [hereinafter Letter from Negaard] (requesting the introduction of a 
proposed Good Samaritan statute). 
94. Letter from Negaard, supra note 93.  Good Samaritans who were not covered by the 
Good Samaritan law included: someone who assisted a choking victim in a restaurant, someone 
who gave CPR to a heart attack victim, or a cab driver who helped an expectant mother.  Id. 
95. Id.  The Act was only intended to apply to people who were off duty and members of the 
public.  Chamley, ¶ 33, 730 N.W.2d at 872 (citing Hearing on H B. 1631 Before the Senate 
Judiciary Comm., 1987 Leg., 50th Sess. (N.D. 1987) (testimony of Representative Janet Wentz)). 
96. See 1987 N.D. Laws 986 (enacting House Bill 1631 as chapter 32-03.1 of the North 
Dakota Century Code). 
97. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-03.1-01 to -08 (1996 & Supp. 2007).  Three specific statutes of 
North Dakota’s Good Samaritan Act were at issue in Chamley: § 32-03.1-01, § 32-03.1-04, and 
§ 32-03.1-05 (2007).  Chamley, ¶¶ 6-8, 730 N.W.2d at 866-67. 
98. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.1-02 (identifying North Dakota’s general Good Samaritan 
rule).  In its entirety section 32-03.1-02 reads: 
No person, or the person’s employer, subject to the exceptions in sections 32-03.1-03, 
32-03.1-04, and 32-03.1-08, who renders aid or assistance necessary or helpful in the 
circumstances to other persons who have been injured or are ill as the result of an 
accident or illness, or any mechanical, external or organic trauma, may be named as a 
defendant or held liable in any personal injury civil action by any party in this state for 
acts or omissions arising out of a situation in which emergency aid or assistance is 
rendered, unless it is plainly alleged in the complaint and later proven that such 
person’s acts or omissions constituted intentional misconduct or gross negligence. 
Id. 
99. Id. § 32-03.1-04.  The “expectation of remuneration” is found in the last sentence of this 
section.  Id.  It prevents physicians or surgeons from being granted immunity under the Good 
Samaritan Act.  Id.  The court in Chamley defines the terms “expectation” and “remuneration” 
according to their dictionary meanings because the terms are not defined within the Act.  
Chamley, ¶ 12, 730 N.W.2d at 868; see also N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-03.1-01 to -08 (failing to 
provide a definition for these terms).  To “expect” is to “anticipate the coming or receipt of.”  
Chamley, ¶ 12, 730 N.W.2d at 868 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 
799 (3d ed. 1993)).  The majority did not define remuneration, but Justice Maring did in her 
concurrence.  Id. ¶ 26, 730 N.W.2d at 870 (Maring, J., concurring).  “Remunerate” is defined as 
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anyone who is “employed expressly or actually for the purpose of providing 
emergency medical aid to humans” from claiming immunity.100 
2. Interpretation of the Act 
Prior to Chamley v. Khokha,101 McDowell v. Gillie102 was the only case 
in which the North Dakota Supreme Court interpreted the Good Samaritan 
Act.103  In McDowell, a roadside accident took place in blizzard condi-
tions.104  McDowell had stopped to check on the occupants of a vehicle that 
had jackknifed into the ditch.105  While McDowell was stopped, his vehicle 
was struck from behind by a second vehicle.106  Gillie, driving a third 
vehicle, stopped to check on the accident with this second vehicle and 
caused a second accident with the McDowell vehicle.107 
McDowell brought an action against Gillie to recover for damages 
resulting from personal injuries.108  The issue in McDowell was whether the 
Act protected Gillie from liability for injuries caused during the second 
accident with the McDowell vehicle.109  The trial court granted immunity 
on a summary judgment motion.110  The North Dakota Supreme Court 
 
“anticipation of pay or salary for service.”  Id. (citing MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY 439 (11th ed. 2005) and BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1296 (6th ed. 1990)). 
100. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.1-05 states: 
This chapter shall not encompass any person who, at the time of the emergency, was 
employed expressly or actually for the purpose of providing emergency medical aid to 
humans, either within or outside of a hospital or other place or vehicle with medical 
equipment, for emergency medical aid or other assistance rendered in the regular 
course of their employment.  Such persons and their employers shall be liable for their 
acts and omissions in rendering emergency medical aid in the regular course of their 
employment, according to the prevailing law in this state. 
Id.  The definition of “‘[e]mployed expressly or actually’ means either that the person’s formal 
duties include the provision of emergency medical aid, or that the person customarily provides 
such aid and is informally expected or relied upon to do so in the course of their employment.”  Id. 
§ 32-03.1-01(3). 
101. 2007 ND 69, 730 N.W.2d 864. 
102. 2001 ND 91, 626 N.W.2d 666. 
103. McDowell, ¶ 8, 626 N.W.2d at 670; see also N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-03.1-01 to -08 
(referencing McDowell as the only case law citing to the statutes within the Act). 
104. McDowell, ¶ 2, 626 N.W.2d at 668.  The roadside emergency is thought of as the typical 
Good Samaritan setting, which is why Good Samaritan immunity was originally only codified as 
part of Section 39-08-04.1, pertaining to motor vehicles.  See H.B. 1291, 1971 Leg., 42d Sess. 
(N.D. 1971) (providing immunity to those who render emergency assistance after a motor vehicle 
accident has occurred). 
105. McDowell, ¶ 2, 626 N.W.2d at 668. 
106. Id.  The McDowell vehicle was hit on the passenger side by a second driver named 
Bryan Martens.  Id. 
107. Id. ¶ 3, 626 N.W.2d at 668-69. 
108. Id. ¶ 4. 626 N.W.2d at 669. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
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reversed and remanded the trial court holding that more than one conclusion 
could be drawn from the evidence.111  The court found that summary 
judgment was therefore inappropriate in McDowell.112 
Under the terms of the Act, the court determined that one, or both, of 
two factors needed to be proven: “(1) that Gillie rendered actions which he 
reasonably believed he could successfully undertake; or (2) that Gillie 
rendered actions which he reasonably believed would benefit an injured or 
ill person and he reasonably believed . . . he could successfully under-
take.”113  These requirements combine the reasonable person standard and 
the subjective state of mind of the person providing assistance.114  The court 
identified that no direct evidence was given on Gillie’s intentions or state of 
mind.115  The court further noted that the presence of these factors was not 
an appropriate issue for a summary judgment determination.116 
While North Dakota has codified the Act, McDowell did not provide a 
clear understanding of how the Act would be interpreted.117  The Act itself 
does not supply enough information to clearly identify when someone will 
be considered a Good Samaritan.118  Chamley brings North Dakota closer to 
achieving clarity under the Act.119 
III. ANALYSIS 
The majority held that the Good Samaritan Act did not grant immunity 
to Dr. Khokha because he had an expectation of remuneration.120  Justice 
 
111. Id. ¶ 25, 626 N.W.2d at 675. 
112. Id.; see also N.D. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (stating that summary judgment is inappropriate 
when genuine issues of material fact are present). 
113. McDowell, ¶ 21, 626 N.W.2d at 674.  These two factors are not referenced within the 
Act itself, nor have they ever been.  See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-03.1-01 to -08 (1996 & Supp. 
2007) (noting other factors that affect immunity, but not these); see also 1987 N.D.  Laws 986 
(forming the original wording of the Act, which also does not include these factors). 
114. McDowell, ¶ 21, 626 N.W.2d at 674.  The “reasonable person” is “[a] hypothetical 
person used as a legal standard, esp. to determine whether someone acted with negligence; specif., 
a person who exercises the degree of attention, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment that society 
requires of its members for the protection of their own and of others’ interests.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1294 (8th ed. 2004). 
115. McDowell, ¶ 23, 626 N.W.2d at 674. 
116. Id. ¶ 21. 
117. See Chamley v. Khokha, 2007 ND 69, ¶ 15, 730 N.W.2d 864, 869 (looking to Texas 
case law because no precedent existed to aid in interpreting the Act’s application); see also 
McDowell, ¶ 21, 626 N.W.2d at 674 (providing no clearly delineated meaning of what is needed 
to be a Good Samaritan, only steps that are needed to establish immunity); 1987 N.D. Laws 986 
(ratifying Section 32-03.1-02). 
118. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-03.1-01 to -08 (identifying people who could have 
immunity, but not clearly defining who is a Good Samaritan). 
119. See id. (referencing McDowell as the only case that cites the Act). 
120. Chamley, ¶ 1, 730 N.W.2d at 865. 
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Maring concurred, identified conflict within the Act, and urged the legisla-
ture to clarify the meaning of an “expectation of remuneration.”121  Justice 
Crothers dissented in part because he did not agree that a physician should 
be stripped of immunity under the Act during all in-hospital emergency 
settings.122  Justice Crothers stated this would contravene the public policy 
behind the Act.123 
A. MAJORITY OPINION 
The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the trial court erred in 
granting Dr. Khokha’s motion for summary judgment.124  The court used 
statutory interpretation principles to identify the meaning and application of 
the Act.125  The court held that Dr. Khokha and Mercy Medical Center were 
not entitled to immunity under the Good Samaritan Act.126 
1. Issue 
The issue decided on appeal was “whether the district court erred in 
granting Dr. Khokha’s and Mercy Medical Center’s motion for summary 
judgment on the basis of Dr. Khokha’s immunity from suit and from 
liability under the Good Samaritan law.”127  The court found that the district 
court erred in making its decision, and reversed and remanded the case.128  
The court held that Dr. Khokha was precluded from immunity as a matter 
of law because he had an “expectation of remuneration.”129 
2. Motion for Summary Judgment 
Mr. Chamley appealed from the trial court’s granting of summary 
judgment in favor of Dr. Khokha and Mercy Medical Center.130  The 
majority found as a matter of law that Dr. Khokha had an “expectation of 
 
121. Id. ¶¶ 38-39, 730 N.W.2d at 874 (Maring, J., concurring). 
122. Id. ¶ 42 (Crothers, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
123. Id. ¶ 54, 730 N.W.2d at 876. 
124. Id. ¶ 1, 730 N.W.2d at 865 (majority opinion).  The opinion was written by District 
Judge Marquart, who was sitting by assignment for Justice Kapsner, who was disqualified.  Id. ¶ 
21, 730 N.W.2d at 869.  Justice Sandstrom concurred with the majority opinion and did not write 
separately.  Id. ¶ 20 (Sandstrom, J., concurring). 
125. Id. ¶ 12, 730 N.W.2d at 868. 
126. Id. ¶ 19, 730 N.W.2d at 869. 
127. Id. ¶ 1, 730 N.W.2d at 865.  
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. Id.  Rule 56 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for 
summary judgment.  N.D. R. CIV. P. 56.  The Rule states that the party resisting the motion for 
summary judgment “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”  
N.D. R. CIV. P. 56(e). 
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remuneration” because the hospital billed the Chamleys for his services,131 
and paid Dr. Khokha his salary.132  Dr. Khokha argued that he was not 
thinking about getting paid, but rather about saving Rosie Chamley’s life.133  
The court found this argument could not be used by Mr. Chamley as an 
inference to preclude summary judgment.134 
The court cited BTA Oil Producers v. MDU Resources Group, Inc.,135 
to establish that mere speculation is insufficient to resist a motion for 
summary judgment.136  The court identified that Dr. Khokha’s testimony 
did not specifically state that he was expecting not to be compensated.137  
The inferences drawn by the court from Dr. Khokha’s statements regarding 
his thoughts at the time of the emergency were insufficient to defeat a 
motion for summary judgment.138  These inferences constituted “mere spec-
ulation.”139  “Genuine issues of material fact” are needed rather than “mere 
speculation” in order to resist a motion for summary judgment.140 
3. Statutory Interpretation 
In order to determine the application of Good Samaritan immunity to 
Dr. Khokha’s situation, the majority read three provisions of the Act 
collectively.141  The general provision provides immunity subject to the 
exception for physicians.142  This exception prevents physicians from being 
granted immunity when they have an “expectation of remuneration.”143  
 
131. See Chamley, ¶ 1, 730 N.W.2d at 865 (noting that Dr. Khokha had an expectation of 
remuneration).  
132. See id. ¶ 10, 730 N.W.2d at 867-68 (stating that Dr. Khokha was a salaried employee 
who “assigned to the hospital all rights to bill and collect fees from patients”); see also Brief of 
Appellant, supra note 9, at 6 (confirming that Mercy Medical Center billed and was paid for all 
services). 
133. Chamley, ¶ 17, 730 N.W.2d at 869. 
134. Id. ¶ 14, 730 N.W.2d at 868. 
135. 2002 ND 55, 642 N.W.2d 873. 
136. Chamley, ¶ 17, 730 N.W.2d at 869 (citing BTA Oil Producers, ¶ 49, 642 N.W.2d at 
887). 
137. Id. ¶ 16, 730 N.W.2d at 868-69. 
138. Id. ¶ 17, 730 N.W.2d at 869. 
139. Id. (citing BTA Oil Producers, ¶ 49, 642 N.W.2d at 887). 
140. Id.; see also N.D. R. CIV. P. 56(e) (“[A]n adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading, but the adverse party’s response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing there is a 
genuine issue for trial.”). 
141. Chamley, ¶¶ 6-8, 730 N.W.2d at 866-67 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-03.1-02, 32-
03.1-04, 32-03.1-05 (1996 & Supp. 2007)). 
142. Id. ¶ 6, 730 N.W.2d at 866 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.1-02). 
143. Id. ¶ 7, 730 N.W.2d at 867 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.1-04); see also Danny R. 
Veilleux, Annotation, Construction and Application of “Good Samaritan” Statutes, 68 A.L.R. 4th 
294, 301 (1989) (stating that some statutes provide immunity only for persons who give 
emergency care without expecting payment). 
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The Act also prevents immunity from being granted to people employed for 
the purpose of providing emergency medical care.144  While it is not 
discussed by the court, a fourth statute becomes necessary to interpret the 
application of immunity.145  Section 32-03.1-01 defines the meaning of 
“employment.”146  It provides that employment for the purposes of emer-
gency care need not be clearly delineated, but rather may be care that is 
“customarily provided” or “informally expected.”147  The court placed the 
heaviest consideration on Section 32-03.1-04 when it determined whether 
Dr. Khokha was entitled to immunity.148 
The court also consulted precedent on statutory interpretation to deter-
mine the meaning of Section 32-03.1-04.149  The statutory interpretation of 
the trial court was reviewable upon appeal.150  The court reversed the trial 
court’s opinion finding that the trial court erred in its interpretation.151  The 
court held that Dr. Khokha’s expectation of remuneration, under Section 
32-03.1-04, precluded him from being granted immunity.152 
The majority established that the provisions of Section 32-03.1-04, 
which state that a physician can collect damages that appear reasonable and 
that a person with an expectation of remuneration could not be granted 
immunity, are not in conflict.153  When conflict exists within the statutory 
scheme, the court must attempt to harmonize the conflicting portions.154  
Since all of the terms within the applicable provisions of the Act are not 
 
144. Chamley, ¶ 8, 730 N.W.2d at 867 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.1-05). 
145. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.1-01 (defining terms found within the Good Samaritan 
Act). 
146. Id. § 32-03.1-01(3) (defining employment as being “employed expressly or actually”).  
Dr. Khokha’s status as an employee of the hospital was a factor in the court’s finding that he had 
an expectation of remuneration.  Chamley, ¶ 18, 730 N.W.2d at 869.  Because Dr. Khokha was an 
employee, it was important to establish what was expected of him under the Act.  See id. 
(identifying whether Dr. Khokha is prohibited from receiving immunity under the Act because of 
his employment status). 
147. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.1-01(3). 
148. Chamley, ¶ 1, 730 N.W.2d at 865 (identifying that the determination of Dr. Khokha’s 
immunity was based on Section 32-03.1-04). 
149. Id. ¶ 12, 730 N.W.2d at 868. 
150. Id. (citing Ballensky v. Flattum-Reimers, 2006 ND 127, ¶ 22, 716 N.W.2d 110, 118). 
151. See id. ¶ 19, 730 N.W.2d at 869 (stating that the trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment on the issue of Dr. Khokha’s expectation of remuneration). 
152. Id. ¶ 1, 730 N.W.2d at 865. 
153. Id. ¶ 13, 730 N.W.2d at 868 (clarifying that “expectation” and “appeared” are the two 
terms in Section 32-03.1-04 that are debatably conflicting, but the court stated that a person may 
have no expectation of remuneration when he or she performs the service, but may later bill a 
reasonable fee and still be permitted immunity).  Justice Crothers noted in his dissent in part that 
there is tension between these provisions of Section 32-03.1-04.  Id. ¶ 46, 730 N.W.2d at 875 
(Crothers, J., dissenting); see also id. ¶ 13, 730 N.W.2d at 868 (recognizing Justice Crothers’ 
dissent on this point within the majority opinion). 
154. Id. (citing Frey v. City of Jamestown, 548 N.W.2d 784, 788 (N.D. 1996)). 
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defined,155 the court used the common meanings of the words to interpret 
their meanings within the statutes.156  The court determined that these 
clauses are not ambiguous because the verbs utilize different tenses which 
allow for harmonization.157  It is through the clarification of this section and 
its reading with the other applicable sections of the Act that the court 
arrived at its conclusion that Dr. Khokha should not be entitled to the 
immunity available under the Act.158 
4. Expectation of Remuneration 
The majority did not discuss how each of the statutes influenced its 
decision.159  Instead the court focused its explanation on Dr. Khokha’s 
expectation of remuneration.160  The majority stated that a salaried physi-
cian has an expectation of compensation for the services rendered during 
the course of his employment.161  For a salaried employee of a hospital, no 
emergency situation can arise in his or her employer hospital that would 
allow for immunity under the Act.162  The court suggested that both the 
contract and the expectation of payment for a service are needed to prevent 
a grant of immunity under the Act.163  The court recognized that there may 
be instances where emergencies occur and one of these factors is not met.164  
In those situations, the court suggested that it would still be possible for 
immunity to be granted.165 
 
155. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.1-01 (1996 & Supp. 2007) (defining some terms, but not 
the “expectation of remuneration”). 
156. Chamley, ¶ 12, 730 N.W.2d at 868 (citing State v. Ulmer, 1999 ND 245, ¶ 6, 603 
N.W.2d 865, 866-67).  Ulmer suggests that words must be interpreted according to their “plain, 
ordinary, and commonly understood sense.”  Ulmer, ¶ 6, 603 N.W.2d at 866-67.  Dictionary 
definitions are used to define the commonly understood meanings of the words.  See Chamley, ¶ 
12, 730 N.W.2d at 868 (using Webster’s dictionary to find the ordinary meaning of words). 
157. Chamley, ¶ 13, 730 N.W.2d at 868. 
158. See id. ¶¶ 6-8, 730 N.W.2d at 866-67 (laying out the applicable provisions of the Act for 
the case). 
159. See id. ¶¶ 1-19, 730 N.W.2d at 865-69 (focusing discussion on Section 32-03.1-04 of 
the North Dakota Century Code rather than how each of the applicable statutes played a role in the 
majority’s decision). 
160. Id. 
161. See id. ¶ 14, 730 N.W.2d at 868 (stating that Dr. Khokha was a hospital employee who 
was being remunerated for the services he performed on Ms. Chamley). 
162. Id. ¶ 18, 730 N.W.2d at 869. 
163. See id. (stating that two factors prevented immunity: (1) Dr. Khokha’s status as a 
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The court acknowledged the possibility of applying Good Samaritan 
laws to the actions taken by a physician within an in-hospital setting.166  It 
suggested that the physician could be granted immunity if he or she were 
not an employee of the hospital where the procedure took place.167  The 
court also stated that immunity may still apply if the employee physician 
renders assistance away from the hospital while off duty.168 
The court cites to a Texas case, McIntyre v. Ramirez,169 as an example 
of a situation where the Act could continue to allow for immunity.170  In 
McIntyre, the physician was visiting a patient at a hospital where he was not 
employed.171  He aided in an emergency situation at this hospital and did 
not bill for his services.172  Dr. McIntyre was granted immunity under the 
Texas Good Samaritan law. 173  The North Dakota Supreme Court used this 
case to demonstrate that physicians could be granted immunity during in-
hospital emergencies if there was no expectation of remuneration.174 
Given the circumstances in Chamley, the court did not grant Dr. 
Khokha immunity because he had an expectation of remuneration.175  The 
court essentially eliminated the possibility of a Good Samaritan defense to 
the most common application for a physician: a salaried employee render-
ing emergency medical assistance within the hospital where he or she is 
employed.176  However, the court did not eliminate the possibility of Good 
Samaritan immunity entirely.177  In narrower situations, physicians may 





169. 109 S.W.3d 741 (Tex. 2003). 
170. Chamley, ¶ 15, 730 N.W.2d at 868 (citing McIntyre, 109 S.W.3d at 742). 
171. Id. (citing McIntyre, 109 S.W.3d at 749).  The court stated that McIntyre did not work at 
the hospital where he provided the emergency care to another physician’s patient; however, this is 
not discussed in McIntyre.  See McIntyre, 109 S.W.3d at 749 (stating that McIntyre regularly 
delivered babies at that particular hospital and received compensation for those services). 
172. Chamley, ¶ 15, 730 N.W.2d at 868 (citing McIntyre, 109 S.W.3d at 749). 
172. Id. 
173. Id.  Under the Texas Good Samaritan law, in-hospital settings are included as locations 
where immunity can be granted; however, many subsections of the rule prevent the granting of 
immunity when the person would ordinarily receive or be entitled to receive a salary, fee, or other 
remuneration from administering care.  TEX. CODE ANN. § 74.151 (2005 & Supp. 2007).  The 
section of the Texas code cited by the court in McIntyre is Section 74.001, but that section was 
renumbered in 2003 and is now found at Section 74.151.  See TEX. CODE ANN. § 74.151 (stating 
the proper language for the Texas Good Samaritan law); see also 2003 T.X. Laws ch. 204 §  10.01 
(renumbering the sections). 
174. Chamley, ¶ 15, 730 N.W.2d at 868. 
175. Id. ¶ 1, 730 N.W.2d at 865. 
176. Id. ¶ 18, 730 N.W.2d at 869. 
177. Id. 
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(1) a salaried hospital employee rendering assistance outside of a hospital, 
or (2) performing an act within the hospital while having the expectation of 
remuneration.178  The court determined that the combination of these two 
factors precluded Dr. Khokha from receiving Good Samaritan immunity.179 
B. JUSTICE MARING’S CONCURRENCE 
To aid in the interpretation of the Act, Justice Maring utilized the prin-
ciples of statutory construction and the legislative intent behind the enact-
ment to clarify its meaning.180  By taking these factors into consideration, 
she determined that physicians were never meant to be covered in in-hospi-
tal emergency settings.181  For this reason, she concluded that immunity 
should not be granted to those who “ordinarily receive” compensation for 
services performed within the hospital.182 
1. Statutory Principles and Legislative Intent 
In interpreting the Act, Justice Maring consulted principles of statutory 
interpretation as found in the North Dakota Century Code and North Dakota 
case law.183  In interpreting statutes, the intent of the legislature is presumed 
clear on the face of the statute.184  The statute is considered ambiguous if 
there are multiple rational meanings.185  In order to clarify, the wording of 
the statute must be considered as a whole and harmonized.186  Meaning 
must be given to every part.187  If there are multiple statutes in an act, the 
statutory provisions must be reconciled.188  The whole must then be 
 
178. Id.  The court states that if a physician is not employed by the hospital and is called to 
assist, or if the salaried physician aids in an emergency outside of the hospital, these physicians 
would still be entitled to claim immunity.  Id. 
179. Id. 
180. See id. ¶¶ 24, 33-37, 730 N.W.2d at 869-70, 872-74 (Maring, J., concurring) (citing to 
chapter 1-02 of the North Dakota Century Code and legislative session bills to clarify the meaning 
of the Act). 
181. Id. ¶ 39, 730 N.W.2d at 874. 
182. Id. ¶ 22, 730 N.W.2d at 869. 
183. See id. ¶ 24, 730 N.W.2d at 869-70 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02 (2005); Meljie v. 
N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 2002 ND 174, ¶ 15, 653 N.W.2d 62, 67; Doyle ex rel. Doyle v. 
Sprynczynatyk, 2001 ND 8, ¶ 10, 621 N.W.2d 353, 356) (providing guidelines for statutory 
interpretation). 
184. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-05). 
185. Id. at 870 (citing Shiek v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 2002 ND 85, ¶ 12, 643 N.W.2d 
721, 725). 
186. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 1-02-07, 1-02-38(2); Meljie, ¶ 15, 653 N.W.2d at 67; 
Doyle, ¶ 10, 621 N.W.2d at 356). 
187. Id. 
188. Id. (citing Grey Bear v. N.D. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2002 ND 139, ¶ 7, 651 N.W.2d 
611, 614).  Contextual consideration must be given to statutes found within an act and the 
purposes for the enactment of the statutes must be considered.  Id. 
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examined with a view of arriving at the true intention of every part.189  To 
aid in the interpretation, legislative history and other outside resources may 
be used.190  However, it must be remembered that the intent of the legisla-
ture would not be something absurd, ludicrous, or unjust.191  Justice Maring 
used these principles to determine the meaning of Section 32-03.1-04 when 
it was read together with the rest of the Act, particularly with Section 32-
03.1-02.1.192 
2. Justice Maring’s Analysis 
Justice Maring concurred in the result of the case, because it was undis-
puted that Dr. Khokha was remunerated for his services.193  She placed 
special emphasis on the intent behind the statutes in the Act.194  She also 
highlighted the differences in the statutory construction of Good Samaritan 
laws across the country.195 
Under common law, a bystander has no obligation to render assistance 
in an emergency situation.196  However, in order to encourage aid from 
strangers, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have enacted some 
 
189. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 1-02-07, 1-02-38(2); Meljie, ¶15, 653 N.W.2d at 67; 
Doyle, ¶ 10, 621 N.W.2d at 356). 
190. Id. at 869-70 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-39). 
191. Id. at 870 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-38(3), (4); McDowell v. Gillie, 2001 ND 91, 
¶ 11, 626 N.W.2d 666, 671). 
192. Chamley, ¶¶ 24-27, 730 N.W.2d at 869-71 (implying from Justice Maring’s concur-
rence that she used these principles to aid in determining the meaning of Section 32-03.1-04; 
however, she does not specifically discuss how each of these principles aided in her interpretation 
of section 32-03.1-04); see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.1-02.1 (posing a conflict with Section 
32-03.1-04 according to Justice Maring): 
A physician licensed under chapter 43-17 who renders emergency obstetrical care or 
assistance to a pregnant female in active labor who has not previously been cared for 
in connection with the pregnancy by the physician or by another person professionally 
associated with the physician and whose medical records are not reasonably available 
to the physician is not liable in any personal injury civil action for acts or omissions 
resulting from the rendering of that emergency care or assistance, unless it is plainly 
alleged in the complaint and later proven that the physician’s acts or omissions con-
stituted intentional misconduct or gross negligence.  The immunity from civil liability 
provided by this section does not extend to a physician who renders emergency 
obstetrical care or assistance with an expectation of remuneration or who collects a fee 
for rendering that care or assistance. 
Id. 
193. Chamley, ¶ 22, 730 N.W.2d at 869. 
194. See id. ¶¶ 32-38, 730 N.W.2d at 872-74 (looking to the legislative testimony behind 
Sections 32-03.1-04 and 32-03.1-02.1 of the North Dakota Century Code to aid in the 
interpretation of the Act). 
195. Id. ¶ 29, 730 N.W.2d at 871 (citing Velazquez v. Jiminez, 798 A.2d 51, 57 (N.J. 2002)). 
196. Id. ¶ 28 (citing McDowell, ¶ 6, 626 N.W.2d at 670).  When a bystander begins to render 
aid, he must use reasonable care or he can be liable for the resulting injuries.  Id. (citing 
McDowell, ¶ 6, 626 N.W.2d at 670; Velazquez, 798 A.2d at 56). 
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form of a Good Samaritan law which provides immunity in certain 
emergency situations.197  There are three common constructions for Good 
Samaritan statutes:198 (1) specifically including hospital settings, (2) specif-
ically excluding hospital settings, and (3) those that are ambiguous as to 
hospital settings.199  North Dakota’s Good Samaritan law is an ambiguous 
provision.200 
3. Legislative History and Intent 
In her analysis, Justice Maring discussed the legislative intent and 
history behind the ratification of the Act.201  House Bill 1631 enacted the 
Good Samaritan Act which is now found in chapter 32-03.1 of the North 
Dakota Century Code.202  In the hearings on the bill, the intent of the 
original Good Samaritan law was focused on emergency situations arising 
from roadside accidents.203  The bill expanded the class of individuals who 
could be granted immunity.204  Non-roadside emergencies also presented 
potential situations where Good Samaritan immunity could be applied.205  
No legislative history contemplated the application of the Good Samaritan 
law in hospital settings.206  Because of this, Justice Maring concluded that 
the legislative intent behind House Bill 1631 did not extend immunity to 
cover in-hospital emergencies.207 
Justice Maring concluded that the majority’s reading of Section 32-
03.1-04 of the North Dakota Century Code frustrated the legislative intent 
 
197. Id. ¶ 29 (citing Velazquez, 798 A.2d at 57). 
198. Id. (citing Velazquez, 798 A.2d at 58). 
199. Id. (citing Velazquez, 798 A.2d at 58-59). 
200. Id. ¶ 30; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.1-02 (1996 & Supp. 2005) (stating the 
general Good Samaritan law). 
201. See Chamley, ¶¶ 32-38, 730 N.W.2d at 872-74 (discussing testimony on House Bill 
1631 and Senate Bill 2422). 
202. Id. ¶ 35, 730 N.W.2d at 873 (citing Hearing on H B. 1631 Before the Senate Judiciary 
Comm., 50th Sess. (1987) (testimony of Sen. Maxson and Rep. Janet Wentz)); see also N.D. 
CENT. CODE §§ 32-03.1-01 to -08 (codifying the Good Samaritan Act). 
203. See Chamley, ¶ 33, 730 N.W.2d at 872 (stating that there were a number of Good 
Samaritan laws in the North Dakota Century Code, but that the broad law was in the motor vehicle 
code); see also Letter from Negaard, supra note 93 (proposing the Good Samaritan statute and 
submitting it to the Senate Judiciary Committee in support of House Bill 1631). 
204. Chamley, ¶ 35, 730 N.W.2d at 873. 
205. Id. ¶ 31, 730 N.W.2d at 871-72 (citing McDowell v. Gillie, 2001 ND 91, ¶ 7, 626 
N.W.2d 666, 669).  Various statutes throughout the North Dakota Century Code provide immuni-
ty: § 23-27-04.1 (emergency medical services operators); § 32-03-40 (firefighters, police officers, 
and peace officers); § 32-03-42 (licensed health care providers for amateur athletics); § 39-08-
04.1 (volunteers at the scene of a disaster or en route to treatment if no expectation of remunera-
tion); § 43-12.1-12 (licensed nurses at an emergency scene); § 43-17-37 (resident physicians 
treating in an emergency); and § 43-17-38 (nonresident physicians treating in an emergency).  Id. 
206. Id. ¶ 36, 730 N.W.2d at 873. 
207. Id. ¶ 39, 730 N.W.2d at 874. 
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and rendered Section 32-03.1-02.1 useless.208  Justice Maring identified 
conflict and ambiguity between these provisions of the Act.209  She ex-
plained that the legislature enacted Section 32-03.1-02 in 1989, after 
Section 32-03.1-04.210  The majority’s interpretation rendered Section 32-
03.1-02.1 moot, according to Justice Maring.211  She noted that it was 
strange for the legislature to allow a surgeon, but not an obstetrician, 
immunity for his services.212 
4. Standard for the Expectation of Remuneration 
Justice Maring urged the legislature to amend the Good Samaritan 
statute to exclude people who “ordinarily receive remuneration.”213  She 
suggested that a more objective standard is needed to define when there is 
an expectation of remuneration.214  She addressed the Texas Good Samari-
tan law, as cited by the majority in McIntyre, which identified two situa-
tions for that expectation.215  The Texas law establishes that immunity can-
not be granted if a person “would ordinarily (1) receive or (2) be entitled to 
receive payment under the circumstances of the case.”216  If the law is left 
having a subjective consideration, the physician’s thoughts are a factor 
which would prevent him or her from receiving immunity.217  No physician 
would testify against his or her own self-interest.218  As a result, Justice 
Maring requested that the legislature amend the Act so it would have an 
objective standard.219 
 
208. Id. ¶ 37. 
209. Id. ¶ 38. 
210. Id. ¶¶ 32, 37, 730 N.W.2d at 872-73; see also 1989 N.D. Laws 1137 (enacting Section 
32-03.1-02); 1987 N.D. Laws 986 (ratifying Section 32-03.1-02). 
211. See Chamley, ¶ 37, 730 N.W.2d at 873 (“All of these circumstances would have been 
already covered by the existing Good Samaritan Act if the legislature had intended it to cover 
emergency assistance rendered in-hospital or in other medical facilities.”); see also id. at 874 
(“Adopting the majority’s construction would render N.D.C.C. § 32-03.1-02.1 an idle act.”). 
212. See id. ¶ 38, 730 N.W.2d at 874 (identifying the unfairness of granting immunity to one 
type of physician providing emergency aid and not the other).  Section 32-03.1-02.1 prevents 
obstetricians from receiving immunity when they provide emergency obstetric care if there was an 
expectation of remuneration.  Id.; see also N.D. CENT. CODE 32-03-02.1 (1996 & Supp. 2005) 
(eliminating immunity for obstetricians when he or she has an expectation of receiving compen-
sation for his or her services). 
213. Chamley, ¶ 39, 730 N.W.2d at 874. 
214. Id. ¶ 26, 730 N.W.2d at 870. 
215. Id. (citing McIntyre v. Ramirez, 109 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Tex. 2003)). 
216. Id. 
217. See id. (stating that the “expectation of remuneration” is based upon the physician’s 
testimony of his or her personal thoughts). 
218. Id. 
219. See id. ¶¶ 26, 39, 730 N.W.2d at 870, 874 (suggesting the current standard is subjective 
and urging the legislature to make an amendment that would objectify the standard). 
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Justice Maring also noted that physicians are not volunteers when they 
are in a hospital setting.220  They can do more than simply render first aid 
until the Emergency Medical Services team arrives.221  The disadvantage of 
not having prior knowledge of a patient’s condition alone should not 
present the need for Good Samaritan immunity.222 
In making these illustrations, Justice Maring requested that the 
legislature amend the Act to clarify its meaning.223  Her request was for an 
objective test.224  This accommodation, however, would effectively change 
North Dakota’s statutory construction from a vague statute to one that 
excludes hospital settings.225 
C. JUSTICE CROTHERS’ CONCURRENCE IN PART, DISSENT IN PART 
1. Concurrence in Part 
Justice Crothers concurred in the result.226  The only portion of the 
majority opinion he concurred with was the reversal of the trial court.227  He 
agreed that the case should be remanded because genuine issues of material 
fact were present, rendering summary judgment inappropriate.228 
2. Dissent in Part 
Justice Crothers dissented because he did not agree that a physician in a 
hospital setting should be excluded from immunity.229  He disapproved of 
the methods used by the court for statutory interpretation and its reading of 
 
220. Id. ¶ 39, 730 N.W.2d at 874 (citing Reuter, supra note 78, at 189).  Physicians are not 
put at the same disadvantage as someone who renders care at the scene of a roadside accident.  Id. 
221. Id. 
222. See id. (“[T]his disadvantage does not rise to the level of the difficulty that confronts the 
physician who stops at the site of a roadside accident, who can provide little more than first-aid 
until the EMS team arrives.”). 
223. Id. 
224. See id. ¶¶ 26, 39, 730 N.W.2d at 870, 874 (urging the legislature to change the 
standard).  Justice Maring stated that the expectations of the individual physician created a 
subjective test under North Dakota law which rendered the exception meaningless.  Id. ¶ 26, 730 
N.W.2d at 870. 
225. See id. ¶¶ 26, 39, 730 N.W.2d at 870, 874 (requesting that immunity be denied to those 
who would ordinarily receive remuneration); see also id. ¶ 26, 730 N.W.2d at 870 (suggesting that 
the legislature never intended to include in-hospital emergency services performed by a 
physician). 
226. Id. ¶ 42, 730 N.W.2d at 874 (Crothers, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
227. Id. ¶ 60, 730 N.W.2d at 878. 
228. Id.; see also N.D. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (stating that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law if there are no genuine issues of material fact). 
229. Chamley, ¶ 42, 730 N.W.2d at 874. 
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Section 32-03.1-04.230  He also opposed the majority’s implicit imposition 
of a duty upon Dr. Khokha.231 
3. Statutory Interpretation 
In interpreting the statutes, Justice Crothers stated that the majority 
ignored the rules of statutory constructions.232  He noted that the majority 
improperly added words to the statute.233  Justice Crothers identified that 
the legislature is supposed to have meant only what it said.234  He stressed 
the importance of reading the text as a whole to harmonize any ambiguous 
provisions.235  He noted that any interpretations of the statutory language 
must be made in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the words, unless 
they are otherwise defined by statute.236  In using these rules of statutory 
interpretation, Justice Crothers found tension within the statute.237 
Justice Crothers suggested that the majority and Justice Maring 
avoided the tension in the collective reading of the statutes.238  The 
expectation of remuneration was used by the majority and Justice Maring to 
deny Dr. Khokha immunity.239  Justice Crothers noted that their interpre-
tations failed to harmonize the “expectation of remuneration” with the first 
provision found in the statute.240  This first provision stated: “Nothing in 
this chapter may be construed to deprive any physician or surgeon licensed 
in this state of the right to collect reasonable fees.”241  Because there was no 
reconciliation of this provision in the statute, Justice Crothers found that no 
ultimate conclusion was reached; therefore, summary judgment would have 
been inappropriate.242 
 
230. Id. ¶ 47, 730 N.W.2d at 875-76. 
231. Id. ¶ 43, 730 N.W.2d at 874-75.  The implicit duty placed upon Dr. Khokha was a duty 
to treat any patient who entered the hospital.  Id. 
232. Id. ¶ 47, 730 N.W.2d at 875-76. 
233. Id. ¶¶ 43, 47, 730 N.W.2d at 874-75.  Justice Crothers thought the majority’s 
interpretation improperly added words to the statute and created a test based on the physical 
location where the service was performed.  Id. ¶ 47.  Justice Crothers did not identify the specific 
words he believed the majority was adding.  Id. 
234. Id. ¶ 53, 730 N.W.2d at 876 (citing State v. Myers, 19 N.W.2d 17, 29 (N.D. 1945); City 
of Dickinson v. Thress, 290 N.W. 653, 657 (N.D. 1940)). 
235. Id. ¶ 47, 730 N.W.2d at 875-76. 
236. Id. ¶ 48, 730 N.W.2d at 876 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-02 (2005)). 
237. See id. ¶ 51 (implying that tension existed within the statute by identifying how the 
other justices ignored it). 
238. Id. 
239. Id. ¶ 9, 730 N.W.2d at 867; id. ¶ 22, 730 N.W.2d at 869 (Maring, J., concurring). 
240. Id. ¶ 46, 730 N.W.2d at 875 (Crothers, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
241. Id. (citing section N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.1-04). 
242. Id. ¶ 49, 730 N.W.2d at 876. 
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4. Implicit Duty 
Justice Crothers also dissented in part because the majority and Justice 
Maring implicitly imposed a duty upon Dr. Khokha.243  However, Justice 
Crothers identified that Dr. Khokha did not have a duty to treat every 
patient in the hospital.244  He also recognized that Dr. Khokha had no prior 
physician-patient relationship with Ms. Chamley.245  Dr. Khokha was not 
on call.246  He also was not an emergency room physician or a member of a 
“code blue” team.247  Dr. Khokha simply volunteered to assist Dr. 
Shahin.248  Dr. Khokha also had no relationship or obligation which 
required him to assist Dr. Shahin.249  Another surgeon was asked to assist 
with Ms. Chamley’s emergency situation, but he refused.250  This other 
physician experienced no consequences as a result of his refusal.251  The 
majority’s and Justice Maring’s opinions did not discuss this other 
surgeon.252 
5. Expectation of Remuneration 
Contrary to the majority and Justice Maring’s concurrence, Justice 
Crothers suggested in his dissent that the “expectation of remuneration” 
should not have presented an issue.253  Justice Crothers indicated that Dr. 
Khokha was a salaried physician; Dr. Khokha would have been paid the 
 
243. Id. ¶ 43, 730 N.W.2d at 874-75. 
244. See id. at 875 (“[I]mplicit in [the majority’s] holding is that Dr. Khokha had a duty as a 
matter of law to treat any and all patients who cross the hospital threshold.”).  Justice Crothers did 
not find anything within the terms of Dr. Khokha’s employment contract requiring him to render 
assistance to other physicians in emergency situations.  Id. ¶ 45. 
245. See id. ¶ 44 (finding that Dr. Khokha had never diagnosed or treated Ms. Chamley 
before entering the operating room to assist Dr. Shahin).  A physician-patient relationship is a 
contractual relationship that can be either express or implied.  Dorothy M. Allison, Physician 
Retaliation: Can the Physician-Patient Relationship Be Protected, 94 DICK. L. REV. 965, 966-67 
(1990).  The contractual relationship imposes a duty on the physician to provide the patient with 
reasonable care of a physician within his or her particular field.  See Heimer v. Privratsky, 434 
N.W.2d 357, 359 (N.D. 1989) (stating the standard of care for physicians and surgeons). 
246. Chamley, ¶ 45, 730 N.W.2d at 875. 
247. Id.; see also supra note 18 (defining a “code blue” team). 
248. Chamley, ¶ 44, 730 N.W.2d at 875.  Dr. Shahin testified that Dr. Khokha had no 
obligation to aid him in his surgery on Ms. Chamley.  Id. 
249. Id. ¶ 57, 730 N.W.2d at 877-78. 
250. Id. at 878. 
251. See id. (stating that another surgeon refused to assist); see also id. ¶ 3, 730 N.W.2d at 
866 (listing the parties to the suit, not including this other surgeon); Brief of Appellee Khokha, 
supra note 1, at 7 (identifying the unnamed surgeon as Dr. Wayne Anderson). 
252. Chamley, ¶¶ 1- 41, 730 N.W.2d at 865-74. 
253. See id. ¶ 50 (Crothers, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (disagreeing with the 
majority on their interpretation of the expectation of remuneration). 
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same amount whether or not he performed the surgery on Ms. Chamley.254  
Justice Crothers noted that Dr. Khokha had a set salary and was not paid on 
a per surgery basis.255  Justice Crothers stated that Dr. Khokha should not 
be precluded from liability because he was paid for his services.256  Justice 
Crothers identified that the physician who decided not to assist Dr. Shahin 
would have had the same “expectation of remuneration.”257 
6. Legislative Intent 
Justice Crothers indicated that the legislature was the appropriate body 
to consider the cohesiveness of the Act.258  He noted that the conflict within 
the Act was an issue for the legislature, rather than the judiciary, to recti-
fy.259  He recognized the discord in the legislative intent behind Sections 
32-03.1-04 and 32-03.1-02.1, as discussed by Justice Maring. 260  He further 
acknowledged a need to resolve the tension found within Section 32-03.1-
04.261 
Justice Crothers identified that the Act was intended to promote action 
from those who have no pre-existing duty to render care.262  By excluding 
hospital settings, Justice Crothers believed the public policy behind the Act 
would be discouraged.263  He also noted that some form of incentive should 
be present for physicians who otherwise would have no duty to help during 
 
254. See id. ¶¶ 46, 50, 730 N.W.2d at 875, 76 (stating Dr. Khokha was a salaried employee 
and that he would have had an expectation of remuneration regardless of his actions). 
255. Id. ¶ 45, 730 N.W.2d at 875 (stating Dr. Khokha was a salaried physician who had his 
own patient that he would have seen if he had not assisted with Ms. Chamley). But see id. ¶ 10, 
730 N.W.2d at 868 (stating that Dr. Khokha was paid on both a salary and incentive basis). 
256. See id. ¶ 50, 730 N.W.2d at 876 (Crothers, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)  
(“Dr. Khokha should [not] be stripped of immunity as a matter of law because he received the 
same pay for trying to save the life of another physician’s patient as he would have, had he done 
nothing.”). 
257. See id. ¶ 57, 730 N.W.2d at 878 (stating the other surgeon was an employee of the 
hospital); see also Brief of Appellee Mercy Medical Center, supra note 4, at 8 (stating Wayne 
Anderson was a general surgeon in the operating room who chose not to help). 
258. Chamley, ¶ 59, 730 N.W.2d at 878 (identifying conflicting legislative policy and intent 
behind the various statutes within the Act but concluding that these considerations were to be left 
for the legislature to review). 
259. Id. 
260. Id. 
261. See id. ¶ 51, 730 N.W.2d at 876 (implying that there is tension within the Section by 
recognizing that the majority and Justice Maring avoided it). 
262. Id. ¶ 54, 730 N.W.2d at 877 (citing McDowell v. Gillie, 2001 ND 91, ¶ 13, 626 N.W.2d 
666, 671). 
263. Id. 
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an in-hospital emergency.264  The effects of Chamley provide North Dakota 
law with additional clarity in the interpretation of the Act.265 
IV. IMPACT 
Chamley may affect many aspects of medical malpractice law in North 
Dakota.266  To begin, hospitals have a duty to hire competent employees 
and set clear standards for them.267  Subsequently, when physicians are 
making determinations whether to render assistance, they have many factors 
to take into account.268  Finally, the legislature can choose to take action 
and look at the policy considerations behind the application of immunity 
and when it can be applied.269  To clarify the interpretation of the Good 
Samaritan Act, the legislature could amend the Act to clarify its 
interpretation.270 
A. DUTIES OF HOSPITALS 
Mercy Medical Center did not perform the surgery on Ms. Chamley.271  
Because of this, Mercy Medical Center was not directly liable for the death 
of Ms. Chamley.272  The hospital only had the possibility of vicariously 
liability because it employed Dr. Khokha.273  The hospital had the responsi-
bility of hiring competent employees to provide patients with reasonable 
care.274  The hospital also had to preemptively address situations that may 
 
264. See id. ¶ 57, 730 N.W.2d at 878 (stating the legislature meant to provide an incentive to 
act and that the majority removed the incentive for physicians in these situations). 
265. See discussion infra Part IV.A–D (indicating the impact on North Dakota). 
266. See discussion infra Part IV.A–D (discussing potential effects on North Dakota medical 
malpractice law). 
267. See discussion infra Part IV.A (recognizing the obligations of a hospital). 
268. See discussion infra Part IV.B (identifying insurance premiums and reputation as major 
factors to take into account when making the determination of whether to render assistance). 
269. See discussion infra Part IV.C (indicating when the immunity applies and policy 
considerations regarding the application). 
270. See discussion infra Part IV.D (discussing possible areas where the legislature could 
amend the Act in order to clarify the meaning and intent of the Act). 
271. See Chamley v. Khokha, 2007 ND 69, ¶ 2, 730 N.W.2d 864, 865-66 (indicating that Dr. 
Shahin and Dr. Khokha performed the surgery while they were at Mercy Medical Center). 
272. See Nelson v. Gillette, 1997 ND 205, ¶ 10, 571 N.W.2d 332, 334 (citing Binstock v. 
Fort Yates Pub. Sch. Dist., 463 N.W.2d 837, 842 (N.D. 1990)) (stating that employers are 
vicariously liable for the torts committed while an employee is acting within the scope of his or 
her employment). 
273. Id. (citing Binstock, 463 N.W.2d at 842) (finding that employers can be liable 
vicariously for the acts of their employees). 
274. See 41 C.J.S. Hospitals § 35 (2007) (indicating that hospitals have a duty to provide 
their patients with reasonable hospital services). 
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result in accidents or emergencies.275  In addressing these potential 
problems, the hospital had an obligation to ensure its employees were 
informed about the hospital’s expectations for its employees’ actions.276  To 
do this, hospitals often turn these expectations into rules and regulations.277  
Chamley should push hospitals to clarify their standards and employee 
contracts to discuss the roles and requirements of employees during in-
hospital emergencies.278 
B. CONSIDERATIONS FOR PHYSICIANS 
Justice Crothers suggested that the majority’s reading was contrary to 
the public policy behind the Act.279  The purpose of the Act is to provide an 
incentive for parties who have no prior obligation to render aid in an emer-
gency situation.280  By depriving physicians of the possibility of immunity 
during in-hospital emergencies, physicians have no incentive to render 
assistance when they have no prior obligation to a hospital patient.281 
By helping a coworker in an emergency, similar to Dr. Shahin in 
Chamley, physicians expose themselves to potential liability.282  This 
exposure could affect the physician financially due to the costs associated 
with defending a lawsuit.283  While malpractice insurance covers the cost of 
 
275. Reuter, supra note 78, at 186.  Pressure is put on hospitals to attain compliance with 
standards and guidelines set by outside organizations which impact the hospital’s accreditation.  
Id.  The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) is one such 
organization because it accredits hospitals. Carol R. M. Moss, You Do Know What You’re Doing? 
Right, Doc? Minnesota Supreme Court Contemplates Negligent Credentialing and Privileging, 30 
HAMLINE L. REV. 125, 140 (2007).  An accreditation from JCAHO is necessary for a hospital to 
be able to participate in the Medicare program.  Robert J. Jacoby, Substandard Care: An 
Overlooked Risk Area?, 9 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 51, 51 (2007). 
276. See Reuter, supra note 78, at 189 (requiring physicians to adhere to hospital standards 
in order to retain staff privileges). 
277. See id. (stating that these regulations are written into the hospital bylaws and into the 
rules and regulations imposed by the hospital upon its staff). 
278. See Chamley v. Khokha, 2007 ND 69,  ¶ 10, 730 N.W.2d 864, 867-68 (discussing the 
employment of Dr. Khokha and identifying that he was required to perform surgeries as directed 
by the hospital); see also supra note 19 and accompanying text (identifying the 
miscommunication in expectations for Dr. Khokha under the terms of his contract). 
279. Chamley, ¶ 54, 730 N.W.2d at 877 (Crothers, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
280. Id. (citing McDowell v. Gillie, 2001 ND 91, ¶ 13, 626 N.W.2d 666, 671). 
281. See id. ¶ 57, 730 N.W.2d at 878 (stating that the legislature likely meant to protect 
people like Dr. Khokha, who render aid when they have no duty to do so, by giving these people 
an incentive to act, and that the majority removed the incentive). 
282. See id. (stating another physician refused to help).  This other physician was not sued in 
connection with this refusal.  See id. ¶ 3, 730 N.W.2d at 866 (naming the parties to the lawsuit). 
283. See Cathleen B. Tumulty, Capping Non-Economic Damages: Is It Really What the 
Doctor Ordered? Predicting the Effect of Federal Tort Reform by Examining the Impact of Tort 
Reform at the State Level, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 817, 820 (2006) (stating that physicians pay the 
premiums for their medical malpractice insurance).  When an action against a doctor is filed, 
        
562 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:535 
defending a suit, the physician will experience increased premiums each 
time the physician is sued.284 
Another ramification that physicians should take into consideration 
when deciding whether to provide assistance is the impact upon his or her 
reputation.285  The doctor’s coworkers are likely going to be upset with him 
or her, and workplace hostility may result if a physician declines to help.286  
Also, coworkers may be less likely to help that physician if he or she 
needed future assistance, particularly in an emergency situation.287  By 
refusing to act, the physician may be harming his or her career.288 
A physician should also consider the effect of declining to render aid 
on his or her obligations to the hospital.289  Hospitals often impose obliga-
tions and standards on physicians outside of those discussed in employment 
contracts.290  Failure to comply with standards could result in sanctions for 
the physician.291  By declining to render treatment, the physician may also 
be violating ethical obligations.292  This too could expose the physician to 
the possibility of sanctions by the hospital.293  In light of Chamley, physi-
cians should consider these factors and make a pre-determined decision 
whether they should render assistance during an in-hospital emergency.294 
 
whether valid or not, the physician’s malpractice insurance premiums are increased.  See id. at 822 
(blaming frivolous suits for malpractice insurance premium hikes). 
284. See id. at 820 (viewing payment of premiums as consideration for paying for the costs 
of coverage for any claims made against the physician during the period of coverage). 
285. See Reuter, supra note 78, at 187 (suggesting that realistically no physician would 
decline a request from a colleague in an emergency situation because of the damage it would do to 
his or her reputation). 
286. Id. 
287. See id. (stating that colleagues would scorn the physician that declined to help). 
288. See id. (implying that a physician would never refuse to help a colleague in an 
emergency situation because it would ruin his or her career). 
289. See id. (suggesting that a physician could be punished by the hospital for declining to 
render assistance). 
290. See id. at 189 (imposing expectations through rules and regulations on the hospital 
staff). 
291. See id. (stating that physicians must agree to conditions outside of employment 
contracts in order to be given staff privileges).  As a result, a violation of these conditions would 
likely result in sanctions or the revocation of staff privileges.  See id. (indicating privileges are 
contingent upon compliance with rules and regulations on the physicians). 
292. See id. at 187 (suggesting physicians who decline to render assistance in an emergency 
are violating their Hippocratic Oath); see also Allison, supra note 245, at 990 (proposing hospitals 
should sanction physicians who fail to live up to their ethical obligations). 
293. See Allison, supra note 245, at 990 (recommending that sanctions be imposed upon 
physicians who violate their ethical obligations). 
294. See Chamley v. Khokha, 2007 ND 69, ¶ 18, 730 N.W.2d 864, 869 (stating that 
employment at a hospital, in tandem with the performance of a procedure, form an expectation of 
remuneration precluding the possibility of immunity). 
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C. APPLICABILITY OF IMMUNITY 
A balance needs to be struck between the incentive to provide help and 
the rights of the patient.295  In order to have an effective Good Samaritan 
law that will increase the likelihood of a physician rendering aid in an emer-
gency, there must be an incentive for the physician to act.296  Other factors 
may, however, influence a physician to act, which would lessen the need for 
Good Samaritan protections.297  Because of this, hospital patients may not 
be considered among the class of people who need rescuing, which could 
make Good Samaritan immunity unnecessary for physicians.298 
Within his dissent in part, Justice Crothers noted that patients who 
experience in-hospital emergencies are at-risk because physicians will not 
want to expose themselves to liability by rendering aid when a preexisting 
obligation does not exist.299  Justice Crothers theorized that the implicit 
duty imposed upon Dr. Khokha by the majority should also be imposed on 
the other physician who chose not to assist Dr. Shahin.300  Chamley presents 
a slippery slope because every salaried physician within the hospital could 
be seen as having an obligation to every patient within the hospital.301  If 
this were the case, both physicians and hospitals would be exposed to a 
greater level of liability.302  
 
295. See Mark Turner, Dial 911: Emergency Medical Care Providers, Gross Negligence, 
and the Loophole in the Connecticut Good Samaritan Statute, 19 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 419, 425 
(2000) (balancing the patient’s interest in recovering damages for substandard care against the 
promotion of quality care from physicians). 
296. Reuter, supra note 78, at 188. 
297. See discussion supra Part IV.B (considering the impact on physicians). 
298. Reuter, supra note 78, at 191. 
299. See Chamley, ¶ 57, 730 N.W.2d at 878 (Crothers, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part) (stating that the majority is putting future emergency patients at risk because physicians no 
longer have an incentive to help). 
300. See id. ¶ 43, 730 N.W.2d at 874-75 (stating the majority imposes an implicit duty upon 
Dr. Khokha to aid all patients entering the hospital); see also id. ¶ 44, 730 N.W.2d at 875 (stating 
that there was another physician who refused to help and was not punished for his failure to 
assist); Brief of Appellee Mercy Medical Center, supra note 4, at 8 (stating the other physician 
was also an employee of the hospital). 
301. See Chamley, ¶ 43, 730 N.W.2d at 874-75 (implying that all similarly situated 
physicians would also have this implicit duty imposed upon them). 
302. See Nelson v. Gillette, 1997 ND 205, ¶ 10, 571 N.W.2d 332, 334 (citing Binstock v. 
Fort Yates Pub. Sch. Dist., 463 N.W.2d 837, 842 (N.D. 1990)) (stating employers can be held 
vicariously liable for the torts committed by their employees during the course of employment); 
Halverson v. Zimmerman, 232 N.W. 754, 757 (N.D. 1930) (explaining that a duty is the first 
element required to establish professional negligence). 
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D. POSSIBLE CLARIFICATIONS 
While some states impose a statutory obligation upon physicians to 
render assistance in an emergency, North Dakota does not.303  The legisla-
ture has not codified a duty to aid others, but has enacted immunity provi-
sions within its Good Samaritan Act.304  However, through the majority 
opinion, a duty is imposed on physicians to provide care during emergen-
cies that occur within the hospital where they are employed.305 
The legislature may need to amend the Act in order to clarify the duty 
imposed by the court.306  Both Justice Maring and Justice Crothers 
discussed the role of the legislature within their opinions.307  Action by the 
legislature may be necessary in order to clarify definitions and policy posi-
tions behind the Act.308 
The legislature could rewrite the general Good Samaritan statute, 
Section 32-03.1-02, to change it from a vague statute to one that either 
expressly includes or excludes hospital settings.309  By doing this, the legis-
lature would clearly identify its intent behind the Act and avoid the tension 
discussed in Chamley.310  A second option would be to clarify the excep-
tions statute, Section 32-03.1-05, to identify if and when physicians can 
claim immunity under the Act. 311  Chamley helped to define this, but due to 
 
303. See Reuter, supra note 78, at 164 (stating that Minnesota and Vermont impose an 
obligation on physicians to render assistance and that the failure to do so constitutes a 
misdemeanor).  Both Minnesota and Vermont impose a general obligation for everyone who 
knows of an emergency to provide care; this obligation is not specifically directed at physicians.  
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01(1) (2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a) (2007).  But see N.D. 
CENT. CODE §§ 32-03.1-01 to -08 (1996 & Supp. 2007) (having no affirmative duty to render 
assistance). 
304. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-03.1-01 to -08 (imposing no obligations to render aid). 
305. See Chamley, ¶ 43, 730 N.W.2d at 874-75 (Crothers, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part) (identifying an implicit duty within the majority’s opinion). 
306. See id. ¶¶ 37, 39, 43, 59, 730 N.W.2d at 873-75, 878.  Justice Maring noted the conflict 
behind the majority’s interpretation of §§ 32-03.1-04 and 32-03.1-02.1 of the North Dakota 
Century Code.  Id. ¶ 37, 730 N.W.2d at 873-74.  She also urged the legislature to take action by 
adding definitions to the Act.  Id. ¶ 39, 730 N.W.2d at 874.  Justice Crothers disagreed with the 
majority’s imposition of an implicit duty.  Id. ¶ 43, 730 N.W.2d at 874-75.  He also stated that it is 
the role of the legislature to identify policy considerations behind the Code.  Id. ¶ 59, 730 N.W.2d 
at 878. 
307. Id. ¶¶ 24-39, 43-59, 730 N.W.2d at 869-78. 
308. See id. (noting a lack of clarity within the Act and the presence of conflicting policy 
provisions behind the statutes within the Act). 
309. See id. ¶ 29, 730 N.W.2d at 871 (citing Velazquez v. Jimenez, 798 A.2d 51, 51-59 (N.J. 
2002)) (identifying three forms of construction for Good Samaritan laws); see also supra note 82 
and accompanying text (discussing the three forms). 
310. See Chamley, ¶¶ 13, 27, 51, 730 N.W.2d at 868, 870-71, 876 (noting the tension within 
the justices’ writings). 
311. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.1-05 (1996 and Supp. 2007) (creating two loopholes in 
the exception which allow for the claim of immunity: (1) if the physician is not employed for the 
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the split of the court, the legislature may want to take an affirmative 
stance.312  A third option for the legislature would be to add another defini-
tion into Section 32-03.1-01 to establish a definition for the “expectation of 
remuneration.”313  The legislature could delineate what it meant rather than 
allowing dictionary definitions to define the phrase.314  These possible 
amendments within the Act would further clarify the intent and purpose 
behind the Act.315 
V. CONCLUSION 
Chamley clarifies North Dakota law under the Good Samaritan Act by 
providing the court another opportunity to interpret the Act.316  Physicians 
are now precluded from immunity under this Act when they are salaried 
physicians who are responding to an emergency within the hospital where 
they are employed.317  This eliminates a possible defense for medical mal-
practice under North Dakota law.318 
Kara Johnson* 
 
purpose of rendering emergency care, or (2) if the physician is acting outside the regular course of 
his or her employment). 
312. See Chamley, ¶¶ 1, 22, 42, 730 N.W.2d at 865, 869, 874 (splitting the court into three 
separate writings). 
313. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.1-01 (defining terms within the Act).  This is seemingly 
where Justice Maring urged the legislature to make the change to identify physicians in hospitals 
as a class that is prevented from seeking immunity.  See Chamley, ¶ 39, 730 N.W.2d at 874 (re-
questing a definition for “with an expectation of remuneration” to exclude those who “ordinarily 
receive remuneration”). 
314. See Chamley, ¶¶ 12, 26, 730 N.W.2d at 868, 870 (defining terms according to their 
dictionary meanings). 
315. See id. ¶¶ 38, 59, 730 N.W.2d at 874, 878 (noting a lack of clarity behind some of the 
policy of the statutes); see also id. ¶ 51, 730 N.W.2d at 876 (noting the tension within Section 32-
03.1-04.) 
316. See id. ¶ 1, 730 N.W.2d at 865 (stating that because Dr. Khokha had an expectation of 
remuneration, he could not be granted immunity under the Good Samaritan Act). 
317. Id. ¶ 18, 730 N.W.2d at 869. 
318. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.1-02 (barring suit when reasonable care is provided 
during an emergency, subject to the exception for physicians who have an expectation of 
remuneration). 
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